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BIDDING THEORY AND THE TREASURY BILL AUCTION:
DOES PRICE DISCRIMINATION INCREASE BILL PRICES?*
Vernon L. Smith
I Introductionand Summary
R

ECENT DISCUSSIONSby MiltonFried-

man [4] and Deane Carson [2] have independently suggested that the Treasury should
abandon the policy of price discrimination in
the weekly auction of 91-day and 182-day
Treasury bills. They would substitute a simulated purely competitive auction in which all
bids are filled at a uniform market-clearing
price determined by the intersection of the
offer quantity and the demand array of submitted bids. Andrew Brimmer [ 1, p. 181] challenged this view, arguing in favor of price discrimination on the ground that efficient ".
resource allocation should be subordinated to
the minimization of interest cost to the Treasury.

. .

." This conclusion requires the as-

sumption, stated explicitly by Brimmer [1, p.
178] that, "Through auctioning new bills (at
discriminatoryprices), the United States Treasury receives higher prices than it could get by
selling these issues at a single price."
This paper is not directed to the question of
whether the Treasury should or should not
practice in the public sector what the Clayton
Act prohibits in the private sector. The paper
is concerned exclusively with the theoretical
question of whether the Treasury would necessarily receive higher prices by employing price
discrimination than it could get by selling the
issues at a single price. From a theory of bidding under uncertainty, which seems to apply
naturally to the Treasury auction, it will be
shown that buyers may be expected to enter
lower bids under price discriminationthan they
would for a simulated competitive auction. If
this analysis is accepted, it suggests that the
Treasury may actually get less revenue from a
given bill offering under price discrimination
than under a competitive auction.
Various approaches might be used in attemDtingto build a model of bidding behavior
* This paper was prepared while the author was a member of the Ford Foundation Faculty Research Seminar on
Experimental Economics, Carnegie Institute of Technology,
August 1964.

in the bill auction. My approach will assume
that bidders desire to maximize expected utility, where the expectation is over a subjective
probability density function for the lowest accepted bid. That is, whether we are designing
a discriminatory auction model or a purely
competitive auction, each bidder is assumed to
associate a subjective probability with each
possible value for the minimum successful bid.
Within this framework, three models will be
discussed. Model I assumes each bidder has a
fixed specified limit price at which he is willing
to buy a specified quantity of bills. I intend
this model to serve as an abstract representation of the behavior of non-dealer participants
corporations and
in the bill auction -banks,
act more or less
insurance companies-who
as final holders of the bills. It is assumed in
Model II that each bidder attaches a subjective
probability density to the price at which he can
resell new bills bought at auction from the
Treasury. I think of this model as applying to
the government security dealers who participate in the auction. Such dealers face not only
the uncertainty, experienced by all bidders, as
to where the low bid will fall, but also uncertainty as to the price that can be obtained by
retailing the new bills in the secondary market
for outstanding bills. In both Models I and II,
the decision variable is the bid price. Model
III is a generalization of II in which the decision variables are the bid price and the quantity of bills to be specified in the bid. From
Models I and II, it is possible to show, unambiguously, that an individual will make at least
as low a bid (and most probably lower) in a
discriminatoryauction as in a single-price competitive auction. From Model III, which seems
to be less tractable, the case rests with an example in which an individual's bid price is less,
and the quantity of bills specified in the bid is
less, under discrimination.
II Mechanicsof the Bill Auction
The weekly bill auction begins each Wednes[ 141 ]
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day when the Treasury releases an announcement, through the reserve banks, inviting
tenders for specified amounts of 91-day and
182-day issues. The weekly offering of 91-day
issues amounts to around $1 billion, that of the
longer issue about half a billion dollars. The
resulting bids are normally tendered the following Monday to each Reserve Bank by the
bill investors in each Federal Reserve district.
Delivery is made to the successful bidders on
the following Thursday. Before 1947, all bids
had to be entered at a specified price. Since
1947, small investors have been accommodated
by permitting the option of submitting noncompetitive bids for limited amounts of bills
($100,000 or less for 182-day bills, $200,000
or less for 91-day bills). The successful competitive bids are filled at their individual bid
prices, while the non-competitivebids are filled
at a quantity weighted average of the accepted
competitive bids. These "noncompetitive"bids
perform, for the price discriminatory auction,
a role analogous to the order "buy at market
or better" used in the organizedstock exchange
auctions. That is, each of these institutional
forms of bidding permits the buyer to be certain of making a purchase, though at the cost
of having to risk the payment of a higher price.
Since the noncompetitive bids do not enter directly into the determination of bill auction
prices, this type of bid will not be analyzed in
what follows. Clearly, if all bids were noncompetitive, auction prices would be indeterminate.
To illustrate price determination, suppose
that the net offering of 91-day bills to the competitive bidders is Q0in figure 1. Qowould be
the total offeringminus the amount of noncompetitive bids. (This arithmetic makes clear
how the noncompetitive bids exert an indirect
influence on price determination.) The array
of competitive bids from highest to lowest
forms an effective demand, dd, for the offering.
The lowest accepted bid would be at PL the
highest at PH.
In this illustration, the gross receipts from
the offeringare given by the area below dd and
SS in figure 1. With respect to the effective demand curve, dd, the seller acts as a "perfect"
price discriminator. By contrast, if this market
were operated to simulate a purely competitive
auction, and if we assume the same bids to have

FIGuRE 1
Price

d

Pa.

S
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Qo
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been submitted as in the example for price discrimination, the result would have been the
uniform market-clearing price, PL, for all suc-

cessful bidders. Under these assumptions, and
this seems to be the accepted reasoning, the
Treasury receives greater revenue from the
offering as a consequence of practicing price
discrimination. However, as will be demonstrated in later sections, it is not reasonable to
suppose the bids will be the same under the two
forms of auctions [3, pp. 391-392].
To illustrate, suppose each bidder, i, in the
market, has a firm reservationprice, Pi, that he
is willing to pay for a unit or lot of the bills
traded. Then the "potential" demand, or limit
price set, is determinedby the ordered set {Pi}
arrayed in descending order from highest to
lowest. Such a set is illustrated by DD in figure
2, and corresponds to the demand curve of
ordinaryprice theory. From the analysis below,
however, when a buyer knows that a successful
bid will be filled at his bid price, he will tend
to bid lower than if he knows it will be filled at
the marginal bid price of all buyers. If the
limit price set is DD, which is the demandunder
a simulated competitive auction, then the ef-
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expected utility maximization model of nondealer bidding behavior in the two alternative
kinds of auction markets. Based upon the resource and opportunity situations faced by such
a bidder, it is assumed that the individual has
a fixed limit price above which he will not bid
for a unit or lot of Treasury bills, in a specific
auction. If P is the given limit price and p is
his bid price to be determined, the individual's
choices are assumed to be governed by a utility
function for money, or "rent," U(P - p), if his
bid is accepted, 0, if it is rejected. Since
the purchase lot size is fixed in this model
it can be set equal to unity without loss of generality. Finally, we suppose that the individual
would have a subjective density function, f(x),
for the minimum successful bid, x, if he were
bidding in a discrimination auction, and g(x),
if he were bidding in the proposed single-price
competitive auction.
With these assumptions, in a discrimination
auction a von-Neumann-Morgensternexpected
utility maximizershould choose his bid, p, so as
to maximize:
p

fective demand, dd, under price discrimination
might be as shown in figure 2. It follows that
for a given DD, and a single auction, price discrimination might yield the Treasury more or
less revenue than the proposed competitive
auction. A seller gets less revenue under price
discrimination if area A < area B in figure 2.
Over time, with repeated bidding in successive
weekly Treasury auctions, if DD and SS conditions were constant, it is clear that the unsuccessful bidders in earlier auctions would tend
to raise their bids, while the successful bidders
would tend to lower their bids. Consequently,
area B would approach zero, as the lower part
of dd rose toward DD. In the bill auction,
however, both DD and SS change from one
auction to another. Indeed, the change is sometimes so great that the range of accepted bids
for one week does not overlap the range for the
following week [4]. Hence, the price uncertainties which lead one to expect dd to be below
DD may persist indefinitely over time.
III Model I: A Theory of Non-Dealer
Bidding Behavior
This section presents an elementary static

ED(U)

x -P.

0

U(P-p)f(x)dx,
0

A maximum occurs at pOon this interval if:
DED

-

= U(P

pO)f(p?)

-

U'(P

-

pO)F(pO)

ap

X> ?, PO= P
{

= Op0 = p* (interior solution)

(1)

For an interior maximum at p*, one must also
have
D2ED

U(P

p*)f'(p*)

-

2U'(P-

p*)f(p*)

+ U"(P - p*)F(p*) < 0.
(2)
The inequality in (2) can be taken as a postulate, or if we assume diminishing marginal
utility, U" < 0, and a unimodal density, f(p),
then the inequality necessarily holds for solutions p* above the mode, since in that region
f' (p) < 0. Figure 3 illustrates an interior solution at D (discrimination).
In a competitive auction, by contrast, since
all bids are filled at the uniform market clearing price, x, expected utility to an individual
entering a single bid is:
p

EC(U)

f2U(P

-x)g(x)dx,

0
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the price at which they turn the bills in the
secondary market will be.
For a given lot of bills, we again assume a
utility function U(P - p) if the bid at price p is
accepted, 0, otherwise, with subjective densities f(x) and g(x), respectively, for the lowest accepted bid in the discriminatory and
competitive auctions. In addition, for the dealers, we assume a subjective probability density
h(P) for the price P at which the bills may be
peddled in the secondary market. The density
h (P) is assumed to be the same regardless of
the type of auction.
In the discriminatory auction expected utility is now:
x0

(3)

p
But, if U(P - p) > 0, and g(p) > 0 on 0
satisbe
never
can
condition
the
equality
P,

ED(U)

=

P

U(P - p)f(x)h(P)dxdP.

f

o

0

Expected utility is maximumat p* if:

DED
0
fied. Therefore, as is intuitively obvious, in
f (p*)I (p*) + F(p*)I (p*)
competitive auctions the expected utility maxDP
imizer will bid his full limit price, P. There is which can be written
no penalty for winning the bid at a quotation
above the market clearing price so the bidding
(P*)
(p*
l (p(P*=
problem reduces to one of maximizing the
chance of success. This is accomplishedby bid- and if:
D2ED
2f (p*)I'(p*) + I(p*)f'(p*)
ding the maximum price P, as illustrated in
figure 3 at point C (competition).
DP2
The conclusion is that a non-dealer would
+ F(p*)I"(p*) < 0,
never bid higher under discriminationthan un- where
der competition, and given the variety of U's
and f(x)'s likely to be encountered in real bidI (p*) =
U(P - p*)h (P)dP, I'(p*)
ders, we should expect a tendency toward solu0
-

A

(4)

A

tions p0 = p* < P under discrimination.

The model can be extended to include the
= - f
U'(P - p*)h (P)dP.
0
case where an individual desires to enter bids
for several lots of bills, and has limit prices By substituting for I(p*) from (4), this last
condition can be written:
P1 < P2 < P3 < . . . for each lot.
D2ED = I(P*)

[ 2f(p*)

F(p*)f (p*)

IV Model II: A Theory of Dealer
f (P*)
DP2
Bidding Behavior
(5)
+ F(p*)I"(p*) < 0.
The distinguishing feature of dealer operafor
utility
In a competitive auction, expected
tions in the bill auction is that they acquire
be:
the same dealer would
new bills for resale in the secondary market.
Their livelihood depends upon an ability to reEC(U) = f f U(P - x)g(x)h (P)dxdP.
sell such bills, on the average, at more favor0
0
able terms than they acquire them. Their profat
A
maximum
p** requires
its are squeezed from below by uncertainty as
to how high the range of accepted bids will be,
DE= 0, or
g(p**)I(p**)
and from above by uncertainty as to how low
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Now, in figure 4 illustrating the solutions (4)
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- f (p)

(P p*)U
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-

h(P)dP = 0.

p*)Q*

(9)

Now suppose utility is quadratic in money. It
is well-known that if the expected utility axioms are satisfied, then any positive linear
transformation of a utility function is also a
utility function. Therefore, we do not lose any
generality by working with a one-parameter
quadratic utility U(m) = m -am2, where m is

t/

<~~~
p

p

money. For this case (8) and (9) can be put in
the form:
Q* =
p_ p*) _ F(p*)
(p- P*) ff(P*)
a[V(P) + (p

and (6) it is seen that p* < p**, since, from
(7), I'(p) <

F (p*)

2(P-p*)

p*)2._

(10)

O and therefore- F(P)r(p) > O

=

(1

Q*
in the neighborhoodof p**.
2 a[V(P) + (P _ p*)2]
The conclusion is that a dealer submitting a
single bid may bid lower in a discrimination where P and V(P) are the mean variance of
Pr
auction than in the proposed competitive aucf (x)dx. By
the density h(P), and F(p*) =
tion.

V Model mI: A Generalizationof II
The previous models assume that the quantity of bills to be taken by the individual bidder
is fixed, with only the bid price a decision variable. Considernow the dealer case where both
the price, p, and the quantity, Q, specified in
the sealed bid are decision variables. It is assumed that the dealer will retail the entire
quantity of bills at a price P, given by a subjective probability density function h(P).
Proceeding as before, expected utility under
the discriminatory organization of the market
is:

eliminating Q* between (10) and (11) we get
the following implicit function in p*:
p*)3

(p_

+

(P-p*)V(P)

= O,
V
(P*) V(P)

-2

(12)

with Q* given by either (10) or (11), once p*
is determined from (12).
In the numerical example below we consider
the special case of (11) and (12) where the
A

density f(p) =

a member of the

e-3(P-P)

I

gamma family. Then F(p)
1
F(p)

=

-

A

e3(P-p)

_

x0

ED(U)

=

o

___=

P

0

4U(P-p)Q]f(X)k(P)dxdP.

Hence,

-

can be written

(12)

and
as a

3
f(P)
cubic, which, if we make the substitution

Necessary conditions for a maximum of y = P- p* will be:
(12a)
3y3 + 3V(P)y - 2V(P) =0.
Es(U) at (p*,Q*) are:
In the competitive auction, expected utility
would be:
DED
U[ (P - p*)Q*]k(P)dP
(p*)
00
P
ZP

(8)

0

00

-

F(p*)

f
0

E0(U)
Q*U' [(P

-

p*)Q* ]k(P)dP = 0

u

=
0

-(P

-x)QI

0

g(x)k(P)dxdP
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with necessary conditions for a maximum at

inatory auction to be below the lowest accepted
bid x in a competitive auction, which in turn is
expected to be below the price P at which the
can be resold in the secondary market.
U
bills
O,
h(P)dP=
[(P-p**)Q**]
?E= g (P**J
Also note that in all three density functions
(13)
P is an upper bound on subjective bill prices.
P**
DE
JffJe (P-x)U'
SDEa
We assume P = 100, i.e., no trader believes it
that bill prices can exceed 100 either
possible
DQ o O
purchased at auction or at resale. No doubt it
[(P - x)Q**] g(x)h(P)dxdP = 0.
is unrealistic to suppose that the most likely
(14) price is P = 100 in each case, but we make this
As above, let U(m) = m - am2. Then (13)
compromise with realism in the interests of
and (14) can be written:
computational simplification. Our purpose is
to provide a counterexample, and if there is
(15)
,
one there are surely millions!
Q**=a[V(P) + (
p**)2]
p**
From the numerical values P = 100, V(P)

(p**, Q**) given by:

A

A

A

A

Q**=

=1,

(P - x)g(x)dx

0

(16)

g(x)dx.

p**
2aS[V(P) + (P

-

X)2]

Where g(x) is the gamma density

e -2 (P

x), then in (16) we have
P**

r

J

_

A

= 14(P-P

+

(P-P),

2)e-2

and
[V(P) + (P
=

X)2] e -2(P-x)dx

-

1/2 {
-1/2)

[V(P)
+

+ P2]

2000.

Substituting

the numbers into

(17), gives the cubic:
2z3+ 3Z2 + 2z - 1 = 0,

Consequently, in this example, the dealer in
a competitive auction bids 98.68, and desires
to purchase 2,900 bills at that bid. In a discriminatory auction he would not only bid less
(98.48) but also take fewer bills (2,000).

P**
J

Q*-

with real positive root z** - 0.32. Hence
p** = P -z** - 98.68, and from (15) Q**
2900.

(P - x)e -2(P-x)dx
-

= 99, the cubic (12a) be-

ing the appropriate numbers into (11) gives

0

-

P =P-1

comes 3y3 + 3y - 2 = 0 with the real positive
98.48.
root y* -- 0.52. Hence p* = P-y* then substitutIf we assume a = 10',

- P(p

J/2 (p2-_p
A

+

l/2)}e-2(P-p).

Then from (15) and (16), making the substitution z = P - p**, gives the cubic
2Z3 + 3Z2 +

[1 + V(P)]Z

-

V(P)

= 0.

(17)

Now consider the following numerical counter example to the hypothesis that the Treasury
receives higher prices under price discrimination, than if the bills were sold at purely competitive auction. Let the subjective density
h(P) = e -(P - p); also gamma. We note
that h(P), g(x), and f (p), have meansP - 1,
P - 2, P - 3, and variances V(P) = 1, V(x)
= 4, and V(p) = 9. These parametersare consistent with a presumption that traders would
expect the lowest accepted bid p in a discrimA

A
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